Aggregation and law.(Introduction through II. Contract Law, p. 2-34): An article from: Yale Law Journal

This digital document is an article from Yale Law Journal, published by Yale University, School of Law on October 1, 2012. The length of the article is 9689 words. The page length shown above is based on a typical 300-word page. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.From the If a plaintiff brings two claims, each with a 0.4 probability of being valid, the plaintiff will usually lose, even if the claims are based on independent events, and thus the probability of at least one of the claims being valid is 0.64. If a plaintiff brings two independent claims, and neither of them alleges misconduct sufficient to justify a remedy, the plaintiff will usually lose, even if the claims jointly allege sufficient wrongdoing to justify a remedy. Thus, as a general rule, courts refuse to engage in what we call factual aggregation (the first case) and normative aggregation (the second case), as well as other forms of aggregation that we identify. Yet we show numerous exceptions to this rule in private and public law. Notably, in public law, the hybrid rights doctrine permits courts to aggregate two weak constitutional claims as long as one involves free exercise of religion. In private law, certain tort and contract doctrines also permit aggregation. We criticize the courts' inconsistent approaches to aggregation, and propose conditions under which courts should (and should not) aggregate.Citation Details Aggregation and law.(Introduction through II. Contract Law, p. 2-34) Ariel Porat Yale Law Journal (Magazine/Journal) October 1, 2012 Yale University, School of Law 122 1 2(33)Distributed by Gale, a part of Cengage Learning